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BEYOND RATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF ANTI-GAY
PARTNERSHIP LAWS UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
David W. Howenstine
Abstract: Anti-gay partnership laws prevent state and local governments from granting
rights, benefits, and obligations associated with marriage to same-sex couples. Fifteen states
have anti-gay partnership laws that prohibit the creation of civil unions, domestic
partnerships, or specific partnership rights for gay couples. Although enacted under
legitimate state authority, these laws come into conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because they isolate gay
citizens for special disadvantages and burdens within the traditional political processes.
Under equal protection analysis, a law that neither burdens a fundamental fight nor targets a
protected class will be presumed valid if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental interest. However, the U.S. Supreme Court uses a more searching form of
rational-basis review when examining laws that exhibit a desire to harm politically unpopular
groups like gay citizens. In Romer v. Evans, the Court held that a constitutional amendment
prohibiting special rights for gay citizens violated equal protection principles because its
extensive breadth could not be rationally justified by legitimate state interests. This Comment
argues that certain anti-gay partnership laws similarly violate equal protection principles
because the sweeping harm they cause to gay citizens cannot be supported by legitimate state
interests in marriage and the family. By contrast, other anti-gay partnership laws likely
survive equal protection analysis because their more narrow prohibition of only
comprehensive partnership rights corresponds more directly to the potentially legitimate state
interests underlying the decision to bar same-sex couples from marrying. Ultimately, the
Equal Protection Clause resists all laws that isolate gay citizens for special disadvantages, but
requires only the invalidation of anti-gay partnership laws that cause broad and sweeping
harm.
The contemporary political struggle over marriage equality in the
United States has been fast and fierce.' As gay, lesbian, and bisexual
citizens2 gain new access to marriage, civil unions, and domesticpartnership benefits across the nation,3 conservative groups seek to
I. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE (2006),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (chronicling recent changes in state marriage laws);
Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.ORG (Nov. 3, 2004),
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=l 36&languageld=l &contentld=l 5576
(discussing the reaction against same-sex marriage in the 2004 elections, as well as legal challenges
to restrictive marriage laws).
2. This Comment refers to gay, lesbian, and bisexual citizens as gay citizens.
3. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN THE U.S. (2005),
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=26860&TEMPLATE=/Content
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solidify the status quo by passing restrictive marriage laws.4 Recently,
fifteen states have used their authority over marriage laws to enact anti-
gay partnership laws that prohibit for same-sex couples the
establishment of civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other rights
traditionally reserved to marriage.5
Anti-gay partnership laws prevent state and local governments from
creating partnership rights for same-sex couples. 6 Unlike laws that
restrict marriage to a union between a man and a woman, anti-gay
partnership laws bar governmental action with respect to a wide range of
potential rights.7 This Comment distinguishes anti-gay partnership laws
based on the scope of the laws and on the citizens targeted by the laws.
8
The scope of anti-gay partnership laws ranges from Class I laws, which
prohibit any and all same-sex partnership rights, to Class II laws, which
ban only comprehensive same-sex partnership rights.9  Anti-gay
partnership laws target either same-sex couples in particular or
unmarried couples in general. t°
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall be denied the equal
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm (reporting that Massachusetts permits same-sex marriage;
Connecticut and Vermont permit same-sex civil unions; California provides almost all marital rights
to unmarried couples; and Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey provide limited rights to unmarried
couples).
4. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1; Peterson, supra note 1.
5. See infra notes 57, 75 (listing sixteen laws of varying scope in fifteen states that bar the
creation of partnership rights similar to marriage rights for same-sex couples and, in some cases, for
all unmarried couples).
6. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (prohibiting the "uniting of two persons of the same sex in a
civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship"), invalidated by Citizens
for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1009 (D. Neb. 2005), argued, No. 05-2604
(8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004) (prohibiting a "civil union, partnership
contract or other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges
or obligations of marriage").
7. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004) (prohibiting a "civil union, partnership contract or
other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage").
8. See infra Part 1I.
9. Compare, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (prohibiting a "civil union, partnership contract or
other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage"), with ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 2 (prohibiting a "[liegal status for
unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status"). The Class I and
Class II categories have been created by the author for the sake of clarity; they do not represent
actual categories used by the states.
10. Compare, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 1, § IV I I ("persons of the same sex"), with ARK. CONST.
amend. 83, § 2 ("unmarried persons").
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protection of the laws." Yet this command must co-exist with the
practical necessity of legislative classifications.12 Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has fashioned a three-tiered system of equal protection
analysis that defers to legislative judgment if a law bears a rational
relation to a legitimate governmental interest, provided that the law does
not burden a fundamental right or target a protected class. 13 However,
the Court has deviated from this system and applied a heightened form
of rational-basis review in a line of cases involving laws that display a
desire to harm politically unpopular groups, such as gay citizens. 14 In
Romer v. Evans,'" for example, the Court departed from traditional
rational-basis review to overturn a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited gay citizens from attaining special legal protections from all
state and local governments. 16 The Court invalidated the amendment
because its scope exceeded all rational relation to the asserted legitimate
state interests. 
1 7
This Comment argues that Class I anti-gay partnership laws violate
the Equal Protection Clause in the same manner as the constitutional
amendment at issue in Romer because their expansive scope exceeds any
rational relation to legitimate governmental interests in marriage and the
family.18 Specifically, anti-gay partnership laws demonstrate a desire to
harm gay citizens and should therefore be analyzed under heightened
rational-basis review. 19 Class I laws violate equal protection principles
because the state-wide prohibition of a broad range of same-sex
partnership rights cannot be justified by legitimate governmental
20interests. In contrast, Class II laws likely survive equal protection
analysis because their more narrow prohibition of only comprehensive
partnership benefits more closely approximates the disputed interests
1 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
13. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985).
14. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that
the Court has applied heightened rational-basis review in U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, and Romer, 517 U.S. 620).
15. 517U.S. 620 (1996).
16. See id. at 632-36.
17. See id. at 635-36.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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underlying the decision to bar same-sex couples from marrying.21
Part I of this Comment describes states' comprehensive control over
marriage laws. Part II examines the different types of anti-gay
partnership laws. Part III discusses the three-tiered system of equal
protection analysis and explores the Court's use of heightened rational-
basis review when laws target politically unpopular groups. Finally, Part
IV argues that Class I laws violate equal protection principles because
their broad scope cannot be supported by legitimate state interests, but
cautions that Class II laws may survive equal protection analysis because
their scope has been more narrowly tailored to serve potentially
legitimate state interests in protecting marriage.
I. THE STATES POSSESS PRIMARY CONTROL OVER
MARRIAGE
By tradition, states exercise primary control over the structure and
regulation of marriage laws.22 States have used this power to reserve an
extensive collection of rights, benefits, and obligations for married
couples.23 These marital rights include social, legal, and financial
benefits that range from property rights to medical decisions to child
24custody. Some state and local governments have established civil
unions or domestic partnerships as a means to extend marital rights to
same-sex couples.25 Nonetheless, a majority of states prohibit same-sex
26
couples from marrying. Courts have disagreed over the
constitutionality of state laws that bar same-sex couples from marrying,
but some courts have concluded that such laws can be justified by state
interests in marriage, the family, and child rearing.27
21. See infra Part IV.D.
22. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
23. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-57 & n.14 (Mass. 2003).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 3 (reporting that six states offer partnership
rights for same-sex couples).
26. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1; Peterson, supra note 1.
27. Compare, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that
a state prohibition of same-sex marriage possesses a rational relation to legitimate governmental
interests), with Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that limiting civil marriage to opposite-sex
couples violates state equal protection).
Vol. 81:417, 2006
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A. States Possess Complete Control over Marriage Laws Except as
Limited by Specific Constitutional Provisions
States possess primary authority over marriage laws as part of their
general police powers to regulate for the health, welfare, morals, and
safety of their citizens2 8 This power is complete except as limited by
specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution that secure certain
fundamental rights against state regulation.2 9 In 1996, Congress
underscored state control over the decision to prohibit same-sex
marriage by passing the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines
marriage as a union between a man and a woman for purposes of federal
law and permits states to refuse to recognize the marriages of same-sex
couples from other states.30
States have used their power over marriage laws to reserve a wide
variety of rights, benefits, and obligations for married couples. 31 Civil
marriage bestows an extensive combination of social, legal, and
financial benefits to married men and women.32 The benefits of civil
marriage confer hundreds of state rights concerning inheritance, taxes,
child custody and adoption, medical decisions, health care benefits, and
property rights, among many others.33
B. Some States and Local Governments Have Established Civil Unions
or Domestic Partnerships for Same-Sex Couples
Some states and local governments have established civil unions or
domestic partnerships for same-sex couples as alternatives to marriage.34
28. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
29. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
30. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
I U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
31. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954-57.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 3 (reporting that California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maine, New Jersey, and Vermont all offer partnership rights for same-sex couples); HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, LAWS AND POLICIES AFFECTING STATE EMPLOYEES (2006), http://hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Center&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentD=
16306 (reporting that eleven states have a law, policy, or union contract that provides domestic
partner benefits for state employees); HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE
FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEES 2004, at 22 fig.6 (2005), available
at http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publicationsl /Stateof_theWorkplace/Workplace
0603.pdf (reporting that 188 cities, counties, and government organizations offer health insurance
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In general, civil unions and domestic partnerships confer many or all of
the rights offered by civil marriage.35 Although the designations vary
between jurisdictions, this Comment uses the traditional legal definitions
of civil unions and domestic partnerships.36 Civil unions are marriage-
like relationships, usually between members of the same sex, that entitle
the parties to substantially all of the rights of civil marriage.37 Domestic
partnerships are relationships "that an employer or governmental entity
recognizes as equivalent to marriage for the purpose of extending
employee-partner benefits otherwise reserved for the spouses of
employees.,
38
C. Some Courts Have Concluded that the State Interest in Marriage
Entitles States to Prevent Same-Sex Couples from Marrying
States possess a compelling interest in the regulation and protection of
civil marriage because marriage represents a basic foundation of the
family and of society. 39 Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized marriage as creating "the most important relation in life" and
as integrally linked to "the morals and civilization of a people. 4 ° In
order to safeguard marriage, states may impose reasonable regulations
on the incidents of and prerequisites to marriage, provided that those
regulations do not significantly interfere with the actual decision to enter
into the marriage relationship.41 Similarly, a state may bar alternative
types of marriage, such as polygamous marriage, that would undermine
the monogamous nature of marriage.42
coverage to public employees' same-sex partners); see also Human Rights Campaign, Equal
Benefits Ordinances (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.hrc.org/ (follow "Workplace" hyperlink; then
follow "Domestic Partner Benefits" hyperlink; then follow "Equal Benefits Ordinances" hyperlink)
(reporting that California and eleven cities and counties have equal benefits laws that require
contractors with state or local government to offer equal benefits to all employees).
35. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 3; HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, LAWS AND
POLICIES AFFECTING STATE EMPLOYEES, supra note 34; see also, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1204(a) (2002) (stating that "[p]arties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections
and responsibilities ... as are granted to spouses in a marriage").
36. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 264, 522-23 (8th ed. 1999).
37. See id. at 264.
38. Id. at 522-23.
39. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
40. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
41. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
42. See Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332-34 (D. Utah 2005) (holding that, even
in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), states possess a compelling interest in
Vol. 81:417, 2006
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Courts disagree over whether the state interest in marriage entitles
states to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying.43 A majority of states
have laws or constitutional amendments that define marriage as a union
between a man and a woman.4 States have claimed legitimate interests
in both the fostering of relationships that are optimal for procreation and
the encouragement of stable families that facilitate the rearing of
children by both biological parents.45 Additionally, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has suggested that the mere preservation of the traditional
institution of marriage may represent a legitimate state interest.
46
In recent years, states' justifications for barring gay couples from
marrying have sustained serious criticism from some courts. 47  The
general tenor of such criticism focuses on the inadequacy of purported
causal links between the recognition of same-sex relationships and harm
to state interests.48 Some courts have even noted that prohibiting same-
sex couples from marrying causes serious harm to the children and
families of same-sex couples, in opposition to asserted state concerns for
family stability and the welfare of children. 49 Nonetheless, in the view of
protecting monogamous marriage, which includes the decision to prohibit polygamous marriage).
43. Compare, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that
state prohibition of same-sex marriage possesses a rational relation to legitimate governmental
interests), and Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 464-65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (same), and
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 272 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (suggesting that the state
could establish legitimate governmental interests served by the prohibition of same-sex marriage,
even though unnecessary under state equal protection principles), with Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that limiting civil marriage to opposite-sex
couples violates state equal protection), and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (same).
This Comment does not directly address the constitutionality of laws barring same-sex couples from
marrying. Rather, this Comment uses the decisions of courts that have upheld such laws as a means
to test anti-gay partnership laws under the most stringent standards. The arguments of Part IV are
even stronger in the eyes of courts that have rejected the asserted state justifications for banning
same-sex marriage.
44. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note I (reporting that forty-one
states have statutes defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman, nineteen states have
constitutional language defining marriage, and seven states have neither).
45. See Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308; Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 461.
46. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-68 (rejecting the state's arguments that prohibiting
same-sex couples from marrying provides a favorable setting for procreation, ensures the optimal
setting for child rearing, or preserves scarce financial resources); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1296-1301 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane) (eviscerating the asserted state interests in a statute
prohibiting gay citizens from adopting).
48. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-68.
49. See, e.g., id. at 964 (noting that excluding same-sex couples from marriage deprives children
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some courts, states possess legitimate interests that justify the decision to
bar same-sex couples from marrying.50
In sum, states have exercised their control over marriage by reserving
specific rights and benefits for married couples. Some states and cities
have established civil unions or domestic partnerships as a means of
granting partnership rights to same-sex couples. However, most states
have exercised their authority over marriage and the family by
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying. Courts disagree on
whether asserted governmental interests entitle states to prohibit same-
sex couples from marrying, but some courts have upheld the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage as justified by legitimate
governmental interests.
II. FIFTEEN STATES HAVE LAWS PROHIBITING
PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
Fifteen states have passed anti-gay partnership laws that prohibit the
creation of civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other rights incident
to marriage either for same-sex couples or for all unmarried couples.5'
These restrictions function in conjunction either with other language in
the laws that bars same-sex couples from marrying or with other sub-
sections that impose the same limitation.52 This Comment divides anti-
gay partnership laws into two classes according to the breadth of the
laws.53 Class I laws broadly prohibit the establishment of any partnership
rights for same-sex couples.5 a Class II laws prohibit the establishment of
of same-sex couples of immeasurable advantages).
50. See, e.g., Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09.
51. See infra notes 57, 75 (listing sixteen anti-gay partnership laws in fifteen states; Texas has
two distinct anti-gay partnership laws, both a constitutional amendment and a statute).
52. Compare, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. X1, § 28 ("Marriage consists only of the legal union between
a man and a woman. No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a
marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect."), with ARK. CONST. amend. 83,
§§ 1-2 (defining marriage as "the union of one man and one woman" in § I and prohibiting "[1]egal
status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status" in § 2). See
also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note I (reporting that forty-one states
have statutes defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman, nineteen states have
constitutional language defining marriage, and seven states have neither).
53. See infra Part II.A-B. This Comment groups anti-gay partnership laws into two general
categories, but the imprecise language of such laws could result in different interpretations as to the
exact scope of a law. As a result, some laws identified as Class I laws in this Comment may
subsequently be interpreted by a court to be Class It laws, and vice versa.
54. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004) (prohibiting a "civil union, partnership contract or
other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
Vol. 81:417, 2006
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same-sex partnership rights, but focus more narrowly on comprehensive
rights.55 Additionally, some anti-gay partnership laws apply only to
same-sex couples, while other such laws apply to unmarried couples in
general.56
A. Class I Laws Prohibit the Establishment ofAny Partnership Rights
Similar to Marriage Rights for Same-Sex Couples
Class I laws prevent governments from establishing civil unions,
domestic partnerships, and other relationships conferring rights
traditionally reserved to married couples. 57 In total, nine states have
enacted Class I legislation.58 The full scope of a Class I law can be
measured as the sum of two dimensions of harm: the types of prohibited
same-sex partnership rights and of the levels of government restricted by
the law.59 Class I laws prohibit same-sex partnership rights ranging from
obligations of marriage").
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2005) (prohibiting "relationships between persons of the
same sex which are treated as marriages"), interpreted by Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d
1199, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting domestic partnerships).
56. Compare, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 1, § IV I ("persons of the same sex"), with ARK. CONST.
amend. 83, § 2 ("unmarried persons").
57. See GA. CONST. art. I, § IV 1 I ("No union between persons of the same sex shall be
recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage."); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16, ("No
relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the
rights or incidents of marriage."); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (providing that no state law shall be
construed so as to "require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any
member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman"); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29
(prohibiting the "uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar same-sex relationship"), invalidated by Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368
F. Supp. 2d 980, 1009 (D. Neb. 2005), argued, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006); N.D. CONST.
art. XI, § 28 (providing that "[n]o other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized
as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect"); OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 35
(stating that no law shall be construed so as to "require that marital status or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups"); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (prohibiting the
creation or recognition of "any legal status identical or similar to marriage"); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.05.013 (2004) (stating that "[a] same-sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as
being entitled to the benefits of marriage"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(a)(2) (Vernon 2005)
(prohibiting any relationship that "grants to the parties of the relationship legal protections, benefits,
or responsibilities granted to the spouses of a marriage"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004)
(prohibiting a "civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the same
sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage").
58. See supra note 57. In May 2005, the Bruning court overturned Nebraska's constitutional
amendment as a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1009, argued, No.
05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006). Nebraska has subsequently appealed that decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id.
59. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (emphasizing that under Nebraska's amendment gay
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the comprehensive benefits of civil unions to the limited employment
benefits of domestic partnerships to solitary partnership rights such as
control over a deceased partner's remains. 60 However, the levels of state
government bound by such laws vary between Class I constitutional
amendments and Class I statutes. 61 While both statutes and constitutional
amendments restrict the actions of local governments, the executive
branch, and the courts,62  only constitutional amendments bind the
actions of the state legislature.63
The key language of Class I laws forbids the creation of partnership
rights similar to marriage for same-sex couples. 64 Attorneys general have
interpreted the language of Class I legislation to bar the establishment of
any rights that are placed on the same plane as rights that arise from
marriage.65 Partnership rights rise to the same plane as marital rights
when they confer the same effect and status as a marital right.66
Nebraska's Attorney General concluded that the state's Class I
constitutional amendment barred the legislature from passing a law that
would have granted control over burial and funeral decisions to the
surviving partner of a same-sex relationship because such decisions were
traditionally reserved to surviving spouses.67 Thus, the Attorney General
recognized that Class I legislation precludes the State from establishing
citizens have not only been denied any potential benefits premised on a same-sex relationship, but
have also been prevented from seeking such rights through the normal political process).
60. See, e.g., Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03004, 2003 WL 21207498, at *1-2 (Mar. 10, 2003)
(discussing rights related to disposition of remains).
61. Compare 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 58 (1998) (recognizing state constitutions as
the supreme will of the people, subject only to the U.S. Constitution, and noting that state
constitutional provisions control the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all political
subdivisions), with 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 11 I (2000) (noting that, unless authorized, municipalities may not enact local laws or
resolutions conflicting with general state laws), and 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and
Dependencies § 40 (2001) (noting that, in general, a state legislature has unlimited power to act in
its sphere of legislation and to pass any law it sees fit, and that one legislature cannot restrict the
power of the succeeding legislature), and IA NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 22:2, 23:3 (6th ed. 2002) (noting that, in general, legislatures have the power to
amend or repeal statutes in order to enact new legislation).
62. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; 72 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; SINGER, supra note 61.
63. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 32 (prohibiting the creation or recognition of "any legal status
identical or similar to marriage").
65. See, e.g., Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03004, at *2; see also Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7171,
2005 WL 639112, at *9 (Mar. 16, 2005).
66. See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03004, at * 1.
67. See id. at * 1-2.
Beyond Rational Relations
even solitary partnership rights for same-sex couples when those rights
would approximate one of the many rights traditionally reserved to
married couples.
68
Class I constitutional amendments remove power from all levels of
state government to establish a wide range of same-sex partnership
rights.69 Nebraska's constitutional amendment represents a primary
example: "Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or
recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a
civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship
shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.', 70  As with any
constitutional amendment, Class I constitutional amendments can be
modified or rescinded only by the passage of a new constitutional
amendment.7 '
Class I statutes also remove power from local governments and
political subdivisions of the state, the judiciary, and the executive branch
to establish a wide range of same-sex partnership rights, but do not
restrict the actions of state legislatures.72 Virginia's statute is a vivid
example: "A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement
between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited. 7 3 Although Class I statutes restrict
the actions of most levels of state government, they do not prevent state
legislatures from amending or rescinding the laws.74
B. Class II Laws Prohibit the Establishment of Comprehensive
Partnership Rights for Same-Sex Couples
Class II laws restrict the same levels of government as Class I laws,
but narrow the range of prohibited rights to comprehensive same-sex
68. See id.
69. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996-97 (D. Neb. 2005)
(noting that any legislation seeking to extend any benefits once incident to or dependent on the
marital relationship to a same-sex couple would violate the Nebraska constitution, thereby requiring
proponents of such legislation to undertake the nigh impossible burden for a minority group of
passing a new constitutional amendment), argued, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006); 16 AM.
JUR. 2D, supra note 61.
70. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, invalidated by Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
71. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
72. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; 72 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; SINGER, supra note 61.
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004).
74. See SINGER, supra note 61.
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partnership rights as opposed to any and all partnership rights.75
Currently, six states have enacted Class II legislation.76 Class II laws bar
any legal status identical or substantially similar to marriage for gay
couples. 77 In both Lowe v. Broward County78 and National Pride at
Work, Inc. v. Granholm,79 state courts held that anti-gay partnership laws
permitted the creation of limited domestic partnership benefits for same-
sex couples because such benefits did not approximate the plethora of
marital rights.80 Thus, a city in a Class II state could not establish civil
unions, but could likely create domestic partnership benefits for city
employees.
81
C. Anti-Gay Partnership Laws Target Either Same-Sex Couples
Exclusively or Unmarried Couples in General
The operative language of anti-gay partnership laws targets the
relationships of either gay citizens in particular or unmarried individuals
in general. 82 Six anti-gay partnership laws apply exclusively to the
relationships of same'-sex couples, 83 five laws apply with specific
reference to unmarried couples, 84 and five laws apply by implication to
75. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 2 (prohibiting a "[legal status for unmarried persons which is
identical or substantially similar to marital status"); KY. CONST. § 233A (prohibiting "[a] legal
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals"); MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 25 (limiting "marriage or [any] similar union" to "one man and one woman"),
interpreted by Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040, at *7
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005) (permitting domestic partnerships); FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2005)
(prohibiting "relationships between persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages"),
interpreted by Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(permitting domestic partnerships); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §3101.01(B)(3) (West 2005)
(prohibiting the extension of the "specific statutory benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital
relationships"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.1 (2004) (prohibiting "any legal status, rights, benefits,
or duties that are substantially equivalent to those provided" to married couples).
76. See supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 2.
78. 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
79. No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005).
80. See Lowe, 766 So. 2d at 1208; Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, at *7.
81. See Lowe, 766 So. 2d at 1207-08.
82. Compare, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § IV I ("persons of the same sex"), with ARK. CONST.
amend. 83, § 2 ("unmarried persons").
83. GA. CONST. art. 1, § IV 1; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, invalidated by Citizens for Equal Prot.,
Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1009 (D. Neb. 2005), argued, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13,
2006); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2005); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.204 (Vernon 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004).
84. ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 2; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; OKLA. CONST.
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all unmarried couples without reference to either same-sex couples or
unmarried couples.85 Thus, while many states with anti-gay partnership
laws have identified same-sex couples specifically, other states have
framed their laws in more general terms.86
D. The State Interests in Prohibiting Same-Sex Partnership Rights
Parallel the State Interests in Banning Same-Sex Marriage
Asserted state interests in anti-gay partnership laws parallel the state
interests in banning same-sex couples from marrying. 87 Some courts
have upheld the limitation of marriage to a union between a man and a
woman as a rational means of fostering relationships optimal for
procreation and encouraging the rearing of children by both biological
parents. 88 These interests apply with similar force to anti-gay partnership
laws.89 In order to satisfy the aforementioned reasoning, either the
availability of same-sex partnership rights would need to diminish the
incentives for heterosexual citizens to enter into the preferred
relationships, or the prohibition of same-sex partnership rights would
need to encourage homosexual citizens to enter into the preferred
relationships.9" However, multiple courts have rejected any alleged link
between the availability or prohibition of same-sex partnership rights
and these asserted state interests. 91 States may also possess a legitimate
art. II, § 35; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2005).
85. KAN. CONST. art. Xv, § 16; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; N.D. CONST. art. Xl, § 28; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.1 (2004).
86. Compare, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § IV I I ("persons of the same sex"), with ARK. CONST.
amend. 83, § 2 ("unmarried persons"), and N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (prohibiting any domestic
union, without reference to the sex of the partners, that is not a marriage between a man and a
woman), and OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 ("unmarried couples or groups"), and OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2005) ("persons of the same sex or different sexes").
87. See supra Part I.C.
88. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
89. Cf id.
90. Cf id.; see also Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *7-
10 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (stating the question as whether not having marriage available
to same-sex couples logically furthers the promotion of stable families or procreation, or, in other
words, whether allowing same-sex couples to marry would injure those legitimate state interests).
91. Cf Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *9-10 (emphasizing that there is no reasonable
expectation that were same-sex couples permitted to marry, married fathers and mothers would
abdicate their parental responsibilities or young, would-be parents would defect from the ranks of
heterosexuals); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,963 (Mass. 2003) (rejecting the
contention that preventing same-sex couples from marrying will increase the number of couples
choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise children); Baker v. State,
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interest in merely preserving the current status quo of marriage, which
could encompass the decision to prevent same-sex partnerships.92
Additionally, states may have a legitimate interest in withholding
alternative partnership rights from couples that have the option to marry
because the availability of alternative partnership rights could undermine
the central role of marriage.93 Nebraska asserted a version of this interest
when it claimed that its Class I constitutional amendment prevented the
piecemeal redefinition of marriage through the granting of benefits to
same-sex relationships.94 Yet at least one state court has rejected this
interest when used to deny same-sex couples access to partnership rights
if the state also prohibits same-sex couples from marrying because same-
sex couples would have no method to access partnership rights.95 Thus,
states may have a legitimate interest in blocking alternative same-sex
partnership rights in order to protect the important role of marriage, but
that interest weakens when a state also prohibits same-sex couples from
marrying.96
In sum, fifteen states have passed laws that prohibit the creation of
civil unions, domestic partnerships, or other relationships similar to
marriage for same-sex couples. The breadth of these laws ranges from
Class I laws, which prohibit all same-sex partnership rights, to Class II
laws, which prohibit only comprehensive same-sex partnership rights.
These laws apply either to same-sex couples exclusively or to unmarried
couples in general. In support of these laws, states may be able to assert
interests similar to those used to exclude same-sex couples from
marrying, as well as an interest in preventing alternative types of
partnership unions.
744 A.2d 864, 882 (Vt. 1999) (stating that preventing same-sex couples from marrying neither
promotes goals of procreation nor protects children).
92. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But cf
Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *7-8 (rejecting the assertion that permitting same-sex couples to
marry would threaten marriage and noting that such an assertion has no relevance in a proper, legal
analysis).
93. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003); see also N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26.8A-2(e) (West 2005) (limiting domestic partnerships to same-sex couples because
opposite-sex couples have the option to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)
(noting that a state may impose reasonable regulations on the incidents of marriage so long as the
state does not interfere with the right to marry).
94. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1004 (D. Neb. 2005),
argued, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006).





III. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT NO CITIZEN BE
DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The U.S. Supreme Court has established a three-tiered system of
equal protection analysis in order to enforce the U.S. Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection under the laws. 7 Under this system, the
Court uses strict or intermediate scrutiny when laws target suspect or
quasi-suspect classes or burden a fundamental right, but uses the more
deferential standard of rational-basis review when analyzing most social
and economic legislation.98 In general, rational-basis review presumes
the validity of a law if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental interest.99 However, when laws display a desire to harm
politically unpopular minorities, the Court deviates from the normal
three-tiered system and applies a more searching form of rational-basis
review involving a much closer examination of whether a law is
rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. 100 While gay
citizens do not represent a protected class, the Court analyzes laws that
target gay citizens for special harm under the heightened form of
rational-basis review. 0 1 State laws that significantly burden the ability
of gay citizens to attain so-called special protections from the
government violate equal protection principles because they cannot be
justified by any legitimate governmental interests. 02
A. Equal Protection Analysis Presumes the Validity of a Law that
Bears a Rational Relation to Legitimate Governmental Interests
Provided that the Law Does Not Target a Protected Class
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment promises
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. 10 3 The
Court interprets this bold command to require that all persons similarly
situated be treated alike. 0 4 In the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan,
the U.S. Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among
97. See City ofClebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985).
98. See id.
99. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
100. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-36.
102. See id.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. See City ofClebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
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citizens."' 10 5 Yet the Court recognizes that the principle of equal
protection must coexist with the practical necessity of legislative
classifications, with resulting advantages and disadvantages to various
groups. 10 6 Accordingly, the Court has fashioned a system of equal
protection analysis that defers to legislative judgment in most situations,
but requires increased scrutiny when laws make classifications based on
certain immutable characteristics that generally have no relevant
legislative purpose. 1
07
Equal protection analysis examines laws under one of three tiers of
scrutiny depending on whether a law targets either a protected class or
burdens a fundamental right. 0 8 Laws that target a suspect class or
burden a fundamental right are analyzed under the Court's highest
standard-strict scrutiny-which requires the invalidation of such laws
unless they have been narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.' 09 Suspect classes include classes defined by race, alienage, and
national origin, while fundamental rights include basic rights protected
by the U.S. Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion."0
Laws that target a quasi-suspect class are analyzed under intermediate
scrutiny, which requires that a court overturn a law unless the law is
substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest."1'
Quasi-suspect classes include classes defined by gender or
illegitimacy."' Finally, laws that neither target a suspect or quasi-
suspect class nor burden a fundamental right are subject to the Court's
lowest level of scrutiny-rational-basis review-which presumes the
validity of a law if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental interest." 
3
Traditional rational-basis review does not entitle a court to judge the
wisdom, logic, or fairness of legislative decisions.' 14 The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that in areas of social and economic policy,
105. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Romer, 517
U.S. at 623.
106. SeeRomer, 517 U.S. at 631.
107. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-42.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 440.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 440-41.
112. Id.
113. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
114. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993).
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courts must uphold laws analyzed under rational-basis review if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification." 5 Although the Court has declared that, at a
minimum, equal protection means that a bare desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,'
1 6
the Court will uphold seemingly unwise or improvident laws that
advance a legitimate governmental interest,' 17 even if that interest was
not the actual motivation for the law." 8 One commentator has noted that
rational-basis review represents such a deferential standard as to amount
to little more than a "virtual rubber stamp."" 9
B. The Court Analyzes Laws that Exhibit a Desire to Harm Gay
Citizens and Other Politically Unpopular Minorities Under a More
Searching Rational-Basis Review
The U.S. Supreme Court analyzes laws that exhibit a desire to harm
politically unpopular minority groups under a heightened form of
rational basis-review that does not defer to legislative judgment, but
rather engages in a more searching inquiry as to whether a law rationally
serves legitimate governmental interests. 120 The Court has not expressly
identified its handiwork as heightened rational-basis review, but multiple
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 12  federal courts, 22 state courts, 23 and
115. Id. at 313-14.
116. U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
117. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
118. See Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313-15.
119. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REV. 56, 79
(1997).
120. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Heightened
rational-basis review has been called by other names, including rational-basis review with bite, Cass
R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1996), active
rational-basis review, Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1998), second order rational-
basis review, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (Marshall, J., with
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and more searching rational-
basis review, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, - U.S. _ (June 23, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2669-70 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("meaningful rational basis review"); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down
such laws under the Equal Protection Clause."); id. at 604 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., &
Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Lawrence Court has "laid waste [to] the foundations of our
rational-basis jurisprudence"); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-55 (Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Court's equal protection cases imply the existence of a continuum
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scholars124 have recognized the Court's use of a heightened form of
rational-basis review, pointing to the Court's decisions in a line of equal
protection cases that it could not have reached under traditional rational-
basis review. 125 In U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,126 City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,127 and Romer, the Court
between strict scrutiny and rational-basis review instead of a precise, three-tiered system); id. at 458
(Marshall, J., with Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("To be sure,
the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed
must ... be called 'second order' rational-basis review .... But however labeled, the rational-basis
test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of [previous cases].").
122. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Court
used heightened rational-basis review in Romer and Cleburne, but holding that the military context
in the instant case foreclosed the normal application of heightened rational-basis review to laws
targeting gay citizens when used to challenge the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy);
Milner, 148 F.3d at 816-17 (discussing the argument that the Court applied a form of heightened
rational-basis review in Cleburne and Romer); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 297 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the Romer Court's use of "extra-
conventional" equal protection analysis); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292-96 (1 th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's Lawrence concurrence correctly identifies the
Court's use of heightened rational-basis review and applying that standard to the law at issue);
Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 959 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Romer Court recognized that gay citizens are protected as a class); Philips v. Perry, 106
F.3d 1420, 1436 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (discussing the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer
line of cases and arguing that governmental interests amounting to the accommodation of prejudice
do not survive rational-basis review).
123. State courts have used heightened rational-basis review to reject state interests in laws that
impose special burdens on or harm gay citizens. See, e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 29-38 (Kan.
2005) (analyzing Lawrence in light of Justice O'Connor's concurrence, and holding that a statute
punishing sodomy between opposite-sex adults and children less severely than between same-sex
adults and children did not possess a rational relation to any governmental interest); Marriage Cases,
No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *2-3 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005) (holding that the
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960-65 (Mass. 2003) (same); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 872 n.5 (Vt. 1999) (same).
124. See, e.g., I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-3 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting that the Court has covertly used a form of heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational-
basis review in Moreno and Cleburne, among other cases); Sunstein, supra note 120, at 53-79
(noting that the rational-basis review in Romer functions more like intermediate scrutiny, and that
Romer continues the Moreno-Cleburne line of case using rational-basis review "with bite"); see also
Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 Ky. L.J. 885, 895 (2001); Jeremy B.
Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis With Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge
Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 2769, 2794-800 (2005).
125. See Sunstein, supra note 120, at 59-64, 77-79.
126. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
127. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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confronted laws that demonstrated a desire to harm politically unpopular
classes-"hippies," mentally disabled citizens, and gay citizens,
respectively-by imposing special burdens on the personal relationships
of the identified minority group. 28 In all three cases, the Court
overturned the challenged law despite the presence of conceivably
rational justifications because each law displayed a strong animus
against an unpopular, disliked, or feared group in relation to the tenuous
interests asserted by the government. 29 As a result, the Moreno-
Cleburne-Romer line of cases demonstrates that the Court applies
heightened rational-basis review to laws that impose particular harm on
the personal relationships of members of politically unpopular groups. 1
30
C. State Laws that Prevent the Government from Establishing a Wide
Range of Rights for Gay Citizens Do Not Possess a Rational
Relation to Legitimate Governmental Interests
State laws with a sweeping and comprehensive scope that prevent gay
citizens from attaining a wide range of rights possessed by others
through access to the traditional political processes violate equal
protection principles. 131 In Romer, the Court struck down Colorado's
Amendment 2, a state constitutional amendment that prevented all levels
of state and local government from establishing any laws protecting gay
128. See id. at 435-37; Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-31; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529-32; see also Lofton
v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292-95 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that the Court's use of
heightened rational-basis review involves scrutiny of laws that burden personal relationships,
including living arrangements in Moreno and Cleburne and intimate same-sex relationships in
Romer).
129. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36 (holding that government interests in associational freedoms
and the conservation of scarce resources could not rationally justify a state constitutional
amendment that prohibited the passage of laws protecting gay citizens from discrimination);
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50 (holding that a city zoning ordinance excluding homes for mentally
retarded citizens could not be rationally justified by interests in safety, legal responsibility,
neighborhood density, or congestion); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535-38 (holding that a regulation
excluding non-family members of a household from a food stamp program could not be rationally
justified by the governmental interest in minimizing fraud).
130. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Sunstein,
supra note 120, at 59-64, 77-79. Even critics of heightened rational-basis review cannot dispute the
Court's final disposition of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). This Comment subscribes to the theory that the Court uses heightened rational-basis
review to analyze laws that target politically unpopular groups, but the conclusions of Part IV would
be the same even if based exclusively on the Court's holding in Romer because anti-gay partnership
laws so closely approximate the law in Romer. See infra Part IV.
131. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
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citizens from discrimination unless the state constitution were first
amended. 132 In its analysis, the Court focused both on the wide range of
laws that would be void under Amendment 2 and on the fact that all
levels of state government were bound by the amendment.' 33 Ultimately,
the Court concluded that Amendment 2 failed rational-basis review
because the extensive harm caused to gay citizens contradicted any
rational relation to the alleged state interests.
1 34
The Romer Court examined Amendment 2 under "rational-basis
review," but declined to accept the legislative judgment of the State and
engaged in its own evaluation of the asserted state interests in
associational freedom and the conservation of scarce resources.
135
Despite the fact that both associational freedom and the conservation of
resources represent legitimate governmental interests, the Court held that
the sheer breadth of Amendment 2 contradicted all rational relation to
those interests.' 36 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Amendment 2
could only have been born and sustained through animus against gay
citizens. 137 The Court overturned Amendment 2 as a violation of equal
protection principles because the amendment could not be tied to any
legitimate governmental interest.
138
By contrast, the mere fact that a law displays animus toward a
politically unpopular class does not necessarily mandate its invalidation
if the law also demonstrates a rational relation between its effects and
legitimate governmental interests. 139 In Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,140 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit distinguished Romer and upheld a city charter
amendment that banned anti-discrimination laws protecting gay citizens
because the local scope of the law could be seen as rationally related to
legitimate governmental interests. 41 The city charter amendment
prohibited the same range of anti-discrimination laws as Amendment 2,
132. Id. at 627,635-36.
133. See id. at 627-31.
134. Id. at 635.
135. See id. at 631-36.
136. Id. at 635.
137. Id. at 634-35.
138. Id. at 635-36.
139. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-01
(6th Cir. 1997).
140. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 301.
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but only removed power from the city government as "local legislation
of purely local scope."'142 In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit conceded that
a state law preventing local governments from granting rights to gay
citizens could not be justified by associational freedoms or cost saving,
but held that a purely local law could possess a rational fit to those
interests.143 Thus, the Equality Foundation court distinguished Romer
based primarily on the levels of government affected by the law. 1
44
In sum, equal protection analysis presumes the validity of laws if they
bear a rational relation to legitimate governmental interests, provided
that they do not target a protected class or burden a fundamental right.
However, when a law exhibits a desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, the Court applies a more searching form of rational-basis review
that does not defer to legislative judgment, but rather requires a closer
examination as to whether the law is rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests or whether it is motivated solely by animus.
Although gay citizens have not been recognized as a protected class, the
Court analyzes laws that exhibit a desire to harm gay citizens under
heightened rational-basis review. State laws that prohibit all potential for
gay citizens to obtain protection from discrimination violate equal
protection principles because their wide scope cannot be justified by
legitimate governmental interests.
IV. CLASS I LAWS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION, BUT CLASS
II LAWS MAY SURVIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Established principles of equal protection analysis require
invalidation of Class I anti-gay partnership laws because such laws
inflict state-wide harm on gay citizens across a broad range of potential
partnership rights in a manner that defies any rational relation to
legitimate governmental interests. 45 Class I constitutional amendments
violate equal protection principles in the same manner as the amendment
142. Id. at 300.
143. See id. But see Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 94-
3855, 1998 WL 101701, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (Gilman, J., joined by five judges,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing the majority's reasoning and arguing
that the Equality Foundation court erred in holding that the local law could bear a rational relation
to legitimate interests based on its direct effects on citizens because Amendment 2 also had
similarly direct effects on citizens).
144. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 297 (6th
Cir. 1997).
145. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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at issue in Romer 146 because the sweeping harm caused to gay citizens
cannot be justified by state interests in heterosexual family structures or
child rearing. Class I statutes similarly violate equal protection
principles. 147 Notably, the state-wide scope of such statutes much more
closely approximates the amendment invalidated in Romer 148 than the
municipal law upheld in Equality Foundation.149 In contrast, Class II
laws likely survive equal protection analysis because they more closely
serve asserted state interests in promoting family structure, child rearing,
and protecting the institution of marriage. t50
A. Anti-Gay Partnership Laws Should Be Analyzed Under Heightened
Rational-Basis Review Because Such Laws Exhibit a Desire to Harm
Gay Citizens
Anti-gay partnership laws should be analyzed under heightened
rational-basis review because they exhibit a desire to harm gay citizens
by imposing special burdens on the relationships of gay citizens. 5'
Many anti-gay partnership laws explicitly single out gay citizens by
targeting same-sex couples, while other laws target unmarried couples in
general. 5 2 In either case, anti-gay partnership laws cause particular harm
to the intimate relationships of gay citizens because same-sex couples do
not have the option to access important rights, benefits, and obligations
through marriage. 153 As a result, even though parts of some anti-gay
partnership laws appear to apply neutrally to all unmarried couples, the
laws as a whole exhibit a particular desire to harm gay citizens because
they effectively foreclose all means of accessing marital rights for same-




148. Cf id. at 627.
149. Equality Found, 128 F.3d at 301.
150. See infra Part IV.D.
151. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Compare, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 1, § IV I ("persons of the same sex"), with ARK. CONST.
amend. 83, § 2 ("unmarried persons").
153. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2(e) (West 2005) (recognizing the heightened importance of
domestic partnerships to same-sex couples because same-sex couples, unlike opposite-sex couples,
do not have the option of accessing partnership rights through marriage).
154. Cf Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002 (D. Neb. 2005)
(concluding that because the Nebraska law goes so far beyond defining marriage the intent and
purpose of the law can only be based on animus against gay citizens), argued, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir.
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The strong implication of animus underlying anti-gay partnership
laws corresponds to the implication of animus underlying Amendment 2
in Romer.155 Just as Amendment 2 removed all power from the
government to grant special rights for gay citizens, so too anti-gay
partnership laws remove all power from governmental entities to
establish certain same-sex partnership rights.156 Furthermore, because
anti-gay partnership restrictions function in conjunction with the
prohibition of same-sex marriage, 157 the additional burdens imposed by
anti-gay partnership laws raise an added inference of animus. The
existence of provisions barring same-sex marriage undermines the
justifications for anti-gay partnership laws because marriage has already
been expressly "protected" from same-sex couples. 158 As a result, the
additional measures of anti-gay partnership laws suggest a desire to
harm same-sex couples and their families instead of a desire to protect
important state interests.159
B. Class I Constitutional Amendments Violate Equal Protection
Because Their Broad Scope Cannot Be Rationally Justified by
Legitimate Governmental Interests
Class I constitutional amendments violate equal protection principles
because the breadth of the harm caused to gay citizens exceeds any
rational relation to legitimate state interests. 60 The harm caused by Class
I constitutional amendments directly parallels the harm caused by the
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer.161 In Romer, the "sweeping
and comprehensive" effects of the constitutional amendment arose both
from the total powerlessness of state and local government and from the
Feb. 13, 2006); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,958 (Mass. 2003) (noting that a
state possesses a legitimate interest in denying partnership rights to couples that could otherwise
choose to marry, but emphasizing that this justification does not extend to denying partnership
rights to same-sex couples if they have been forbidden to marry).
155. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
156. See supra notes 57, 75; 16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; 56 Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; 72
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61.
157. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
158. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (noting that the total prohibition of any establishment
of civil unions or other same-sex partnerships does not advance a state's interest in the preservation
of marriage and may, in fact, undermine it).
159. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
160. Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
161. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
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wide range of laws prohibited by the amendment. 62 Similarly, Class I
constitutional amendments possess an expansive scope in both respects.
Class I constitutional amendments remove power from all levels of state
government in the same manner as the Romer constitutional
amendment. 163 Moreover, this powerlessness extends across the full
spectrum of potential same-sex partnership rights, from comprehensive
civil unions to limited domestic partnerships to solitary rights. 64 Both
dimensions of harm impose significant burdens on the ability of gay
citizens to attain same-sex partnership rights.'
65
The expansive negative effects of Class I constitutional amendments
cannot be justified by state interests in marriage, family structure, or
child rearing just as the broad scope of the constitutional amendment in
Romer could not be justified by asserted state interests. 166 The Romer
Court held that Colorado's interests in associational liberty and the
conservation of resources could not rationally support the extensive
harm caused by Amendment 2 because the scope of its effects so far
overshadowed the minimal interests. 167 Likewise, the breadth of harm
caused by Class I constitutional amendments cannot be rationalized as a
means to further state interests in preserving marriage or preferred
family structures. 168 First, the Class I prohibition of all partnership rights
is not necessary to protect the traditional institution of marriage as a
union between a man and a woman because same-sex couples have
already been barred from marrying. 69 Second, Class I constitutional
amendments likely do not alter the incentives for gay citizens to enter
into heterosexual relationships or state-preferred child rearing
structures. 170 Thus, Class I constitutional amendments possess only a
162. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
163. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 997, 1002 (finding Nebraska's constitutional amendment
indistinguishable from Amendment 2); 16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61.
164. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1004; see also Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 03004, 2003 WL
21207498, at *1-2 (Mar. 10, 2003) (discussing rights related to disposition of remains).
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2dat 1002.
167. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
168. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1002; cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
169. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (noting that the total prohibition of any establishment
of civil unions or other same-sex partnerships does not advance a state's interest in the preservation
of marriage and may, in fact, undermine it); cf Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA,
2004 WL 1738447, at *8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (rejecting the basic assertion that
permitting same-sex couples to marry would threaten marriage).
170. Cf Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2003) (rejecting the
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minimal connection to asserted legitimate governmental interest in
contrast to the substantial harm they cause to gay citizens.171 This
disparity mandates the invalidation of Class I constitutional amendments
under equal protection analysis because the breadth of harm caused by
the laws cannot be rationally supported by such a negligible relation to
asserted state interests.1
72
C. Class I Statutes Violate Equal Protection Principles Because Their
Broad Scope Exceeds All Rational Relation to Legitimate
Governmental Interests
Class I statutes cause less extensive harm to gay citizens than Class I
constitutional amendments, but still violate equal protection principles
because their effects are too broad to be rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests. 173 The scope of Class I statutes mirrors the scope
of Class I constitutional amendments with respect to the types of
partnership rights prohibited, but differs with respect to the levels of
government affected. 7 4 Whereas Class I constitutional amendments
remove power from all levels of state government, Class I statutes bind
the actions of local governments, state agencies, courts, and the
executive branch, but do not restrict the actions of state legislatures to
amend or rescind the laws.
175
The effects of Class I statutes on the political process more closely
approximate the scope of the constitutional amendment struck down in
Romer than the city charter amendment upheld in Equality Foundation
because Class I statutes cause expansive, state-wide harm to gay
contention that preventing same-sex couples from marrying would increase the number of couples
choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise children); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 882 (Vt. 1999) (stating that preventing same-sex couples from marrying neither
promotes goals of procreation nor protects children); Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *9-10
(emphasizing that there is no reasonable expectation that were same-sex couples permitted to marry,
married fathers and mothers would abdicate their parental responsibilities or that young, would-be
parents would defect from the ranks of heterosexuals).
171. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
172. Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
173. Cf id.
174. Compare 16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61 (noting that state constitutions bind all levels of
state government), with 72 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61 (noting that state legislatures have plenary
law-making power, except as limited by constitutional provisions, and that one legislature cannot
restrict the power of the succeeding legislature).
175. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; 56 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61; 72 AM. JUR. 2D, supra
note 61; SINGER, supra note 61.
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citizens. 176 The Sixth Circuit rested its decision in Equality Foundation
on the fact that the charter amendment represented "local legislation of
purely local scope,"' 177 while Amendment 2 in Romer embodied state-
wide legislation at the highest level. 178 Class I statutes more closely
resemble Amendment 2 because they remove all power from local
governments to pass any same-sex partnership rights, and also restrict
the actions of state agencies, courts, and the executive branch.
1 79
The extent of harm caused by Class I statutes cannot be rationally
justified by alleged state interests in the family, child rearing, or
protecting the institution of marriage.1 80 Although Class I statutes do not
replicate the full harm of Class I constitutional amendments, Class I
statutes violate equal protection principles in the same manner as Class I
constitutional amendments because both Class I statutes and Class I
constitutional amendments remove power from most levels of state and
local government and prohibit the identical range of same-sex
relationship rights. 181 In Equality Foundation, the Sixth Circuit conceded
that state laws removing power from all local governments to pass
special rights for gay citizens could not be rationally justified by
reference to associational freedoms or the conservation of resources.
82
In similar fashion, Class I statutes that remove all power from local
governments, state agencies, courts, and the executive branch to grant
any same-sex partnership rights cannot be rationally supported by
minimally-related interests.' 83  As with Class I constitutional
amendments, Class I statutes possess only a tenuous link to any asserted
interests.184 Thus, Class I statutes violate equal protection principles
because their extensive scope cannot be rationally justified by any
legitimate governmental interests.'
85
176. Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 627; Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1997).
177. Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
178. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
179. See supra Part II.A.
180. Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
181. Cf id.
182. See Equality Found, 128 F.3d at 300.
183. Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300.
184. Cf Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1004 (D. Neb. 2005),
argued, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006).
185. Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
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D. Class II Laws May Survive Equal Protection Analysis Because Their
Scope More Closely Serves the Asserted Interests Underlying the
Decision to Prohibit Same-Sex Couples from Marrying
In contrast to Class I laws, Class II laws may be consistent with equal
protection principles because the range of same-sex partnership rights
prohibited more closely fits asserted state interests in protecting the
traditional institution of marriage, even though such laws bind the
actions of all or most levels of state government. 86 The key difference
between Class I laws and Class II laws lies in the range of same-sex
partnership rights prohibited by the laws rather than the levels of
government affected by the laws.' 87 Whereas Class I laws prohibit all
partnership rights for same-sex couples, Class II laws prohibit only
comprehensive partnership rights.188 In both Granholm and Lowe, state
courts held that anti-gay partnership laws permitted cities to establish
domestic partnerships because limited employment benefits did not
approximate the extensive combination of rights associated with
marriage. 189 Thus, state and local governments could establish laws
granting many partnership rights for same-sex couples, even if they
could not extend the full benefits of civil unions to same-sex couples.190
Courts may view Class II laws as rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests to a similar degree as laws barring same-sex
couples from marrying.' 9' Some courts have concluded that the decision
to exclude same-sex couples from marriage can be justified by interests
in family structure and child rearing. 192 These justifications correspond
directly to Class II laws because civil unions represent marriage in all
186. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2005), interpreted by Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.
2d 1199, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting domestic partnerships); cf, e.g., Equality
Found., 128 F.3d at 300-01; Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
187. Compare Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 995-97 (discussing the wide range of same-sex
relationships called into question by the law at issue), with Lowe, 766 So. 2d at 1208 (holding that
the statute at issue does not prohibit domestic partnerships).
188. See, e.g., Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97 (noting that Nebraska's law prohibits any
legislation seeking to extend any benefits once incident to or dependent on the marital relationship
to a same-sex couple); Lowe, 766 So. 2d at 1208 (holding that the statute at issue does not prohibit
domestic partnerships).
189. See id.; Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040, at *7
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005).
190. See Lowe, 766 So. 2d at 1207-08.
191. Cf, e.g., Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09.
192. See, e.g., id.
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but name.1 93 As a result, the creation of civil unions for same-sex
couples would cause a substantially similar effect on the underlying
family and child rearing interests that states have used to justify
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying. 94 Courts that embrace
these rationales in the context of banning same-sex marriage could
extend them to uphold anti-gay partnership laws under equal protection
analysis.
195
In the alternative, courts could potentially uphold Class II laws as
supporting a state interest in maintaining civil marriage as the primary
means of accessing marital rights. 196 States may possess a legitimate
interest in withholding partnership rights to couples that could otherwise
choose to marry. 197 However, the use of this rationale to justify anti-gay
partnership laws would weaken a state's justifications for barring same-
sex couples from marrying because same-sex couples would be denied
all possible access to comprehensive marital rights. 1
98
Ultimately, Class II laws may survive equal protection analysis
because the more limited range of same-sex relationships prohibited by
such laws does not contradict all rational relation to potentially
legitimate governmental interests. 99 Despite the fact that Class II laws
operate at a state-wide level, their scope does not so totally eclipse
alleged state interests as to contradict all rational relation. 20 0 Although
many courts reject the validity of these interests, courts that have upheld
laws barring same-sex marriage could also conclude that Class II laws
bear a rational relation to state interests in family structure, child rearing,
or the protection of marriage as an institution.20 '
193. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (stating that parties to a civil union shall have all
the benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law as are granted to spouses in a marriage).
194. See supra Part IID.
195. Cf, e.g., Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09.
196. Cf Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) (noting that




199. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
200. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2005), interpreted by Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.
2d 1199, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting domestic partnerships); cf, e.g., Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1997);
Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09.




Anti-gay partnership laws prevent state legislatures and local
governments from granting rights, benefits, and obligations associated
with marriage to same-sex couples. In practical effect, these laws
exclude gay citizens from the traditional political processes used to
attain partnership rights, and expose same-sex relationships to particular
harm. These laws come squarely into conflict with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that no person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Although the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent all legislative classifications, it does require that
such classifications demonstrate a rational relation to legitimate state
interests. However, when a law exhibits a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group like gay citizens, the Court turns a more searching and
demanding gaze on the alleged justifications underlying the law. Courts
analyze anti-gay partnership laws under heightened rational-basis review
because such laws cause particular harm to gay citizens. Class I
constitutional amendments and Class I statutes, which prohibit the
creation of any and all same-sex partnership rights, violate equal
protection analysis because their broad and sweeping scope contradicts
any rational relation to state interests in marriage and family. In contrast,
Class II laws, which prohibit the establishment of only comprehensive
same-sex partnership rights, may survive equal protection analysis
because the more narrow prohibition of civil unions more closely serves
those same state interests. Ultimately, equal protection analysis resists
the sweeping reach and implied malice of all anti-gay partnership laws,
but only requires the invalidation of Class I laws as beyond all rational
relation.
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